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hy would a journal that tracks and analyzes emerging
infectious disease trends devote an entire issue to tuber-
culosis, a disease that emerged some 15,000 to 35,000 years
ago (1,2)? The disturbing answer is that tuberculosis is reap-
pearing in many countries as a public health crisis. Thus, if not
an emerging disease, it is an important reemerging disease, and
though ancient, it is not a disease of the past. A staggering 1.9
million around the globe die of tuberculosis each year—
another 1.9 billion are infected with Mycobacterium tubercu-
losis and are at risk for active disease (3).
In the 20th century, the United States made impressive
strides in tuberculosis control. From the early 1900s, when
some areas began systematic reporting of death rates, tubercu-
losis rates steadily declined from approximately 200 deaths
per 100,000 per year to less than 1 death per 100,000 in 1985.
In 1953, a national surveillance system was established for
reporting new cases of tuberculosis disease; that year, reported
annual incidence was 53 cases per 100,000 population (4).
From 1953 to 1984, tuberculosis disease incidence dropped
steadily at an average rate of 5.8% per year to 9.4 cases per
100,000. 
In 1985, however, the United States saw a reversal in this
long-standing downward trend, and tuberculosis reemerged as
a public health threat. From 1985 to 1992, not only did the
number of cases increase from 22,201 to 26,673, but also large
outbreaks were reported. Many of these, especially in hospitals
and other health-care settings in large cities (5), were caused
by multidrug-resistant M. tuberculosis. Several factors contrib-
uted to this increase, including the emergence of the HIV epi-
demic and large influxes of immigrants from countries in
which tuberculosis was common. Perhaps the major reason for
the reemergence, however, was the end in 1972 of categorical
federal funding for control activities and the subsequent deteri-
oration of public health infrastructure for tuberculosis control.
In response to the crisis of reemerging tuberculosis, cate-
gorical grants were restored and federal funding was
increased. The funding, modest at first, rose sharply in 1992
and again in 1993 and 1994. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) transfers most of its appropriated funds
to tuberculosis control programs in states and large cities.
These funds support clinics and laboratories, administer
directly observed therapy, intensify investigation of latent
infection in persons at high risk for active disease, sponsor
clinical and epidemiologic research, and expand surveillance
to monitor the impact of these efforts. Renewed investments
paid off, and after a peak in 1992, tuberculosis incidence in the
United States has declined each year. From 1992 to 2001, the
annual decline averaged 7.3%, even greater than before 1985.
But future success is not guaranteed. The National Academy
of Sciences Institute of Medicine, in its 2000 report on tuber-
culosis control efforts in the United States, warned against the
“complacency and neglect” that come with declining numbers
of cases and reaffirmed the goal of TB elimination (annual
incidence of <1 case per 1,000,000 population) in the United
States (6). 
In 2001, the 15,989 tuberculosis cases reported to CDC
represented only a 2% decline from 2000, the smallest decline
in 9 years. Although data from a single year do not constitute a
trend, these numbers may be the first sign of stagnation in our
control efforts. The proportion of cases in persons born outside
the United States is growing; in 2001, that figure reached 50%.
Efforts to reduce tuberculosis transmission in the United States
have little effect on reducing risk for those infected elsewhere.
The proportion of cases in persons born in other countries will
probably continue to rise, unless domestic programs providing
tuberculosis services for immigrants are strengthened and
international programs are expanded. Another risk, in the cur-
rent climate of bioterrorism, is the possible intentional spread
of multidrug-resistant M. tuberculosis. This risk requires new
tools for detection and rapid and effective response. Currently
strengthened surveillance systems closely monitor changes in
disease epidemiology. If tuberculosis elimination progress in
the United States slows, we are prepared to respond quickly.
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